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Electricity Capacity Requirements: Who Pays? 
Timothy J. Brennan 
Abstract 
Reserve requirements in electricity markets may get each producer to internalize the cost of grid-
wide blackouts it might cause if unable to meet consumer demand. Markets for how such capacity might 
be procured have been studied. Less examined is how the costs of reserve capacity are covered. “Who 
pays” depends on how requirements are designed. If each producer has to provide peak capacity available 
to a grid operator at a below-spot price, requirements will increase volatility—that is, the gap between 
baseload and marginal peak prices. Requirements based on energy sales act as a tax on baseload to 
subsidize peak, reducing volatility. Finally, if requirements are designed to ensure that extreme-peak 
energy is available without scarcity rents, baseload prices remain unaffected, but (nonextreme) peak 
prices increase. Although this pattern seems unrelated to any economic or social goal, it replicates what 
one might see under crude seasonal or time-of-use pricing. 
Key Words:  capacity requirements, reserve requirements, electricity generation, utility 
regulation 
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Electricity Capacity Requirements: Who Pays? 
Timothy J. Brennan∗ 
Introduction 
A fundamental design feature of electricity markets, in both the franchise monopoly and 
the open market eras, is the requirement to construct and maintain extra capacity for generating 
electricity.1 In most businesses, firms may retain excess capacity, in either production itself or in 
inventory of already-produced goods, for a variety of reasons: to dissuade current customers 
from going elsewhere if demand is unexpectedly high, serve new customers if other suppliers fail 
to meet delivery timetables, ensure the ability to meet contractual commitments to supply a 
customer, or smooth out prices in the face of predictable swings in demand. But however 
important these justifications may be in any particular industry, they are rarely the focus of 
government regulation. Although courts can impose penalties for failures to meet contractual 
obligations, we do not typically have laws mandating extra seating in restaurants or keeping a 
full range of shoe sizes in the stockroom. 
Consequently, at first blush, capacity requirements lead to inefficient pricing. Were 
potential unreliability the only problem, coping with outage risk could be internalized to the 
supplier. If customers wanted to smooth out payments, they could do so through borrowing 
during off-peak periods to cover costs during peak seasons. With uncertainty, consumers might 
                                                 
∗ Professor, Policy Sciences and Economics, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, and Senior Fellow, 
Resources for the Future. Email: brennan@umbc.edu. Thanks for helpful comments go to Jeff Church, Joseph 
Doucet, Douglas Hale, Andrew Kleit, Karen Palmer, and Jamie Wimberly. I also received numerous useful 
comments on an earlier version of this paper from those attending the Rutgers University Center for Research in 
Regulated Industries 16th Annual Western Conference, Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 
especially Hung-Po Chao, Robert Levin, Steven Ostrover, Cliff Rochlin, and Gary Stern. Special thanks go to 
Steven Stoft for maintaining links to useful materials on his website (www.stoft.com). Errors and omissions remain 
the author’s sole responsibility. 
1 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access 
Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, Docket No. RM01-12-000 (2002), at 252–90; 
Joskow, Paul, Comments before FERC, Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission 
Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, Docket No. RM01-12-000, Jan. 10, 2003, at 14–48. FERC recently 
modified its proposal to eliminate specific nationwide reserve requirements, leaving it to states within regional 
transmission organizations. FERC, “White Paper: Wholesale Power Market Platform,” at 11. 
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want to insure against high peak prices, but that preference could be satisfied directly through 
contract.2 
The rationale for such requirements, seemingly inefficient or superfluous in most 
markets, is easy to address in theory, although using it to quantitatively set reserve margins 
remains difficult. As has been pointed out elsewhere,3 electricity differs from other commodities 
in fundamental ways that could justify, among other things, capacity requirements. In addition 
 to being an important commodity, electricity is both vulnerable to supply-demand imbalances 
(because storage costs are prohibitive) and interconnected (because switching costs are 
prohibitive). For that reason, if one supplier fails to meet the demands of its customers, not  
only will those customers lose service, but also all customers sharing the distribution grid will 
lose power.  
The need to maintain balanced loads over an interconnected grid creates what we might 
call the “blackout externality.”4 As one observer puts it, “everyone is denied service in a shortage 
situation.”5 Accordingly, investments to maintain reliability and prevent demand from exceeding 
capacity have benefits to the public at large. The blackout externality can justify policies to 
encourage broader use of real-time metering, for example.6 Regulatory policies that prevent retail 
                                                 
2 Note that either with smoothing certain payment or insuring against peak prices, it would be more efficient, in 
principle, to divorce the borrowing or insurance premium from the price of electricity. Failures in capital or 
insurance markets thus could warrant policies that lead power companies to install extra capacity as a second-best 
response, but we ignore such possibilities here. 
3 Brennan, Timothy, Karen Palmer, and Salvador Martinez, Alternating Currents (Washington, DC: Resources for 
the Future, 2002); Steven Stoft, Power System Economics (New York: Wiley, 2002).  
4 Others call this a “free rider network externality” or “capacity externality.” Ruff, Larry, “Competitive Electricity 
Markets: Why They Are Working and How to Improve Them,” n/e/r/a, May 12, 1999, at 28; Jaffe, Adam, and Frank 
Felder, “Should Electricity Markets Have a Capacity Requirement? If So, How Should It Be Priced?” Electricity 
Journal (December 1996): 52–60. 
5 Duckworth, Jack, “The Fatal Flaw in Electric Power Deregulation,” Energy Pulse (www.energypulse.net), 
accessed 2/18/03; Stern, Gary, “Resource Adequacy in Competitive Electricity Markets,” presented at the Rutgers 
University Center for Research in Regulated Industries 16th Annual Western Conference, Advanced Workshop in 
Regulation and Competition, June 27, 2003. 
6 Brennan, Timothy, “Market Failures in Real-Time Pricing: A Theoretical Look,” Resources for the Future 
Discussion Paper 02-53, October 2002. Severin Borenstein (“Frequently Asked Questions about Implementing Real-
Time Pricing in California for Summer 2001,” University of California Research Institute, March 2001) and Steven 
Stoft (“The Market Flaw California Overlooked,” New York Times, Jan. 2, 2001, A19) cite inadequate real-time 
pricing in explaining the poor performance of some electricity markets. Absent the blackout externality, cost savings 
and intertemporal efficiency improvements in and of themselves need not justify policy to subsidize real-time 
meters. Their arguments might be better thought of as objections to regulatory policies that prevented customers 
from any exposure to real-time electricity costs.   
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or wholesale prices from rising high enough to conform to peak-period power costs can also 
justify policies to increase supply or limit demand, such as demand-side management subsidies 
of more efficient heating and cooling systems.7 Capacity requirements can substitute for 
regulations or inadequate demand response that prevent prices from clearing electricity markets. 
Not all industry observers believe that a blackout externality exists. They argue that if 
demand for electricity were responsive to prices, there would be no need for capacity 
requirements.8 If demand response were sufficiently great to prevent any blackouts from 
occurring, the externality would in fact disappear. But in most cases involving risk, reducing the 
likelihood of an adverse outcome to zero is prohibitively expensive; tolerating some risk is 
efficient. If this general rule holds for electricity outages, a blackout externality would justify 
some policy intervention, be it capacity requirements or subsidies for real-time meters or other 
technologies that reduce consumption during periods of high demand. 
Although the rationale for capacity requirements is widely appreciated, little analytical 
attention has been devoted to how the cost of capacity requirements is borne. Understanding how 
they work presents at least two difficulties. First is ascertaining what a reserve margin means. 
Must one have excess capacity whenever one operates? That would invite an obvious 
inefficiency. Why would one require capacity and then not use it?  Effectively taxing capacity 
through reserve requirements just to pay for more capacity would seem to offer no effect on 
marginal capacity costs, and thus no effect on quantity of capacity or prices of electricity. 
Second, the term “reserve margin” suggests that it is a call option provided to the grid 
manager to call upon as needed. If so, we need to know the strike price for the call option—that 
is, the price at which the energy from this reserve capacity would be sold to the grid operator or 
at its request. If the strike price is just the spot price, the requirement is meaningless; capacity 
could be procured in real time without any requirement. If the strike price is less than the spot 
price, who covers the cost of the call option? A related third point is determining what counts as 
eligible reserve capacity. If any called-upon capacity has to be paid the cost of actually bringing 
it online, those under the requirement can choose technologies with very low capital cost, down 
to hamsters in wheels. 
                                                 
7 Brennan, Timothy, “Demand-Side Management Programs under Retail Electricity Competition,” Resources for the 
Future Discussion Paper 99-02, October 1998. 
8 Fraser, Hamesh, “A Critique of the Resource Adequacy Requirement of FERC’s SMD NOPR,” Electricity Journal 
16 (April 2003): 23–28. 
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To improve our sense of how capacity requirements play out, we assume perfect foresight 
in the quantity of power demanded during two periods, on and off-peak, and the fraction of time 
or probability at which demand is at peak levels. This assumption is less problematic than it 
might appear. Variations in demand induce considerable price volatility, but that is not the same 
thing as price uncertainty. Electricity prices can be much higher on hot August afternoons than 
on mild April mornings, and consumers may have some interest in smoothing out payments to 
avoid the summer spike. But these variations may be quite predictable. The more significant 
stochastic factor in electricity markets is probably not on the demand side but on the supply 
side—that a generation unit may go down unexpectedly. An outage of that kind is the sort of 
thing against which consumers (or liable load-serving entities) might want to insure through 
paying for capacity requirements. The magnitude of that risk, and the size of the blackout 
externality, would determine how much extra capacity should be put in place to mitigate against 
such risk.  
As noted earlier, it is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate what the reserve margins 
should be. We also omit discussion of how a reserve requirement might be implemented and 
reallocated through capacity markets, and related technical engineering issues.9 However, the 
question remains of who pays for the insurance provided by these reserve requirements. To 
answer the “who pays” question rather than the “how much” question, we need not get into the 
specifics of the uncertainty that underlies the requirements in the first place. The question before 
us is the incidence of the costs of a reserve requirement, not whether they exceed the benefits. 
Incorporating a specific model of uncertainty would not provide any additional insight into 
understanding who pays; we can infer from the underlying uncertainty whether the incidence of 
payments for capacity requirements is likely to reduce volatility or reproduce a stream of 
payments that consumers may prefer.  
To understand who pays, we specify two generation technologies, peak and off-peak; 
later we add a third “extreme peak” technology. We also adopt three modeling approaches. After 
                                                 
9 For more on those, see Stoft, n. 3 supra at Part 2; Hirst, Eric, and Brendan Kirby, “Technical and Market Issues for 
Operating Reserves,” Oct. 19, 1998, available at 
http://www.ornl.gov/ORNL/BTC/Restructuring/Operating_Reserves.pdf; Cramton, Peter, “Review of the Reserves 
and Operable Capacity Markets: New England’s Experience in the First Four Months,” Nov. 17, 1999, available at 
www.cramton.umd.edu; Hobbs, Benjamin, Javier Iñon, and Steven Stoft, “Installed Capacity Requirements and 
Price Caps: Oil on the Water or Fuel on the Fire?” Electricity Journal 14 (July 2001): 23–34; Shankar, Roy, “Is an 
Adequacy Market Necessary?” Electric Power Generation Association presentation, Oct. 16, 2002. 
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setting a benchmark, we first portray requirements as a mandate that all suppliers allow the grid 
manager to purchase energy from some fraction of the installed capacity at a preset strike price 
during peak periods. Baseload prices would remain unchanged, but peak prices would rise for 
those who cannot purchase energy at the strike price. If capacity requirements are based on 
installed capacity, they are thus likely to increase volatility—that is, the difference between peak 
and off-peak prices. 
Under a second approach, reserve requirements are based on production rather than on 
installed capacity. In that scenario, requirements create a tax on electricity use to subsidize 
peaking capacity, raising baseload rates and reducing peak-period prices. To help untangle the 
effects of the requirements, it can be helpful to treat reserve requirements not in quantity terms 
but in price terms, such as a subsidy to encourage more peak capacity, where the tax is paid per 
unit of output. This can be translated back into a quantity-based capacity target, where one 
specifies a tax sufficient to lead to the desired amount of additional capacity.10 With that, the first 
of these may be partly translated back into a “fractional increase of capacity/reserve margin” 
requirement. In this setting, volatility decreases; peak prices fall from the capacity subsidy, and 
baseload prices rise to pay for it—a pattern consumers might prefer because it smoothes out 
payments. This suggests that the obligation to provide capacity should be based not on capacity 
itself but on energy production, imposing a higher requirement on baseload plants.  
Finally, we examine a setting in which electricity demand can take on normal baseload, 
higher peak, and infrequent but very high extreme values with different probabilities. In this 
setting, we follow analyses of electricity markets that presume that electricity should be priced at 
the average variable cost of the marginal supplier.11 All baseload and peak producers install 
sufficient extra extreme capacity (as a fraction of their normal capacity) to meet such demand at 
the variable costs of that capacity.12 We show that this requirement leaves baseload prices 
unaffected but raises peak prices (if it does not drive peak producers out of business).  It is 
                                                 
10 Jaffe and Felder, n. 4 supra, discuss how uncertainty can affect the equivalence of price-based and quantity-based 
capacity requirements in electricity. 
11 Borenstein, Severin, James Bushnell, and Frank Wolak, “Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California’s 
Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market,” American Economic Review 92 (2002): 1376–1405; Joskow, Paul, and 
Edward Kahn, “A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California’s Wholesale Electricity Market during 
Summer, 2002” Energy Journal 23 (2002): 1–35; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order on Rehearing of 
Monitoring and Mitigation Plan for the California Wholesale Electricity Markets, Establishing West-Wide 
Mitigation, and Establishing Settlement Conference. EL00-95-031 et al., June 19, 2001, at 27–28, 34. 
12 Under this requirement, no one would enter just to provide service in the event of extreme demand. 
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difficult to ascertain a demand for insurance against high prices that would be paid during peak 
periods but not at baseload. However, policies that impose seasonal or time-of-use variations in 
electricity demand may embody a kind of averaging of peak and extreme-peak prices, leaving 
baseload rates unaffected.  
The benchmark model 
Following the models of peak-load pricing in Dansby and in Crew and Kleindorfer,13 
assume that there are two generating technologies, baseload and peak, indicated by subscripts B 
and P. Peak plants, however, operate only a fraction R of the time. The long-run average (hence 
marginal) cost of each technology is constant, including a per/MWh capital component K and 
variable component V. Baseload plants operate full-time. The per capacity unit cost of producing 
baseload power is KB + VB. The per capacity unit cost of producing peak power for the fraction 
R a peak-period power plant operates is KP + RVP.  
We suppose that baseload technology is uneconomical if used only during peak periods, 
and peak-load technology is uneconomical if run all the time. The first of these implies that 
 K B + RVB > KP + RVP;  
the second implies that 
 K P + VP > KB + VB.  
These expressions can be combined as 
 V P – VB > KB – KP > R[VP – VB]. (1) 
A baseload plant has higher per unit capital cost than a peaking plant, but that difference 
is less than the difference between the variable cost of the peaking plant and the variable cost of 
the baseload plant, were both operated full-time. That makes it uneconomical to operate a 
peaking plant as a baseload unit. However, that difference in capital costs exceeds the difference 
in operating costs for plants operated only R of the time, making it uneconomical to construct a 
peaking plant using baseload technology. 
                                                 
13 Dansby, Robert, “Capacity Constrained Peak Load Pricing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 92 (1978): 387–98; 
Crew, Michael, and Paul Kleindorfer, The Economics of Public Utility Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1986).  
6 Resources for the Future  Brennan 
Let PP be the peak energy price. Peaking plants will be constructed up to the point at 
which the revenue obtained from an additional unit of capacity, RPP, just equals the cost of 
constructing and operating that capacity, KP + RVP. In equilibrium, 
 RPP = KP + RVP 
or 
 P P = KP/R + VP.14    (2) 
Baseload capacity will be installed up to the point at which revenues earned from such 
capacity equal the costs of construction and full-time operation. A baseload plant charges PP for 
the fraction R of the time, plus the baseload price PB the rest of the time, 1 – R. Thus, revenues 
equal costs when 
  [1 – R]PB + RPP = KB + VB. 
Substituting from (2) and rearranging terms gives 
 P B = VB +  [ ]
R 1
RV K RV K P P B B
−
− − +
.  (3)   
If peak and baseload technologies are identical—that is, KB = KP and VB = VP—then the 
baseload price PB just equals VB, the variable cost. All capital costs are recovered during the 
peak period. If the technologies differ, equation (1) implies  
 V P > PB > VB. 
The baseload price exceeds the baseload plant’s variable costs such that the plant produces 
enough revenue to cover baseload capacity.15 That price, however, is less than the variable cost 
of a peaking plant, which recovers all of its capital (nonvariable) costs during the peak period. 
                                                 
14 Studies of whether there is market power in the sale of electricity at peak periods typically neglect the capital 
component, measuring instead the margin between price and only the average variable cost of the most expensive 
plant necessary to supply peak power. Brennan, Timothy, “Mismeasuring Electricity Market Power,” Regulation 
(Spring 2003): 60–65. 
15 This suggests that off-peak prices will also exceed variable costs and include a component for capital recovery, 
casting additional doubt on studies that attempt to ascertain market power by comparing prices and variable costs. 
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Capacity-based reserve programs 
A natural interpretation of a reserve margin would be that for each unit of electricity one 
plans to produce, one has to have Z% more capacity. We can embed such a requirement in our 
present model. Assume further that if demand is at peak, the imposer of the capacity 
requirement—the regulator, grid manager, or independent system operator—allows generators to 
sell energy from this added capacity at a “strike price,” PS, following our characterization of 
reserve margins as a call option. Following the benchmark model, we abstract from uncertainty 
to display more clearly the expected effects of capacity-based reserve policies. With no 
uncertainty, this “call option” becomes nothing more than a partial payment by the grid operator 
for the capacity. We presume that PP ≥ PS ≥ 0, and that the grid operator covers the cost of this 
power through sales, perhaps at the market price, perhaps at cost. 
First, focus on the peak-period sellers. Assume that for each unit of capacity they use, 
they have to install Z (presumably less than one) additional units of peaking capacity, and that 
the regulator imposing the requirement can ensure that the reserve capacity is suitable for 
providing power at peak periods. We assume that peak plants are in service a fraction R < 1 of 
the time. The seller gets PP for sales from the unit it installs on its own, and PS for sales from the 
Z units it has to install in addition to comply with the margin requirement.16 The marginal 
operating cost of planned and reserve capacity remains VP.  
Let PP' be the equilibrium peak price with the reserve requirement. In equilibrium, peak 
sellers will install capacity until the point at which the revenues cover its costs:  
 R[PP' + ZPS] = [KP + RVP][1 + Z],   (4) 
implying 
 P P' = KP[1 + Z]/R + VP[1 + Z] – ZPS. 
The net change in the peak price from the benchmark is 
 P P' – PP =   

 




Z =  Z [ P P
                                                
 – PS] > 0.  (5) 
 
16 We consider below the possibility that the capacity is installed but not used. Again, we assume that regulators can 
verify that reserve capacity is suitable for peak use. 
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The option requirement implicitly taxes some peak purchases to subsidize those at the 
strike price.  If the strike price equals operating cost, then the peak price charged in the market 
overall increases as if capacity were taxed at the rate KPZ/R.17 If the strike price PS is the same as 
the equilibrium price PP', PP' = PP. The reserve requirement has no effect on peak-period prices 
and overall capacity.18 
Turning now to the baseload plants, we assume that under the reserve requirement, the 
baseload generators install Z units of peak capacity for every unit of baseload capacity they 
install. This assumption has three justifications. First, peak capacity costs less than baseload 
capacity (see equation (1)) and thus would be chosen by baseload plants if they were free to 
choose.19 Second, the nominal purpose of this policy is to provide extra capacity when electricity 
demand is greater, not when it is relatively low. Third, absent a strike price below the 
presumably low baseload price, the argument above for peak power would mean that the 
baseload plants would end up charging the same baseload energy price and installing the same 
amount of capacity, making a reserve margin meaningless. 
For every unit of baseload capacity installed and operated full-time, the baseload 
generator earns PP' R amount of the time and PB', the new baseload price, 1 – R of the time. We 
also assume that the baseload plant sells energy from its reserve capacity at the strike price PS, 
operating the fraction R of the time demand is at peak. Accordingly, in equilibrium, revenues 
from the last unit of baseload installed must cover associated costs: 
 R[PP' + ZPS] + [1 – R]PB' = KB + VB + ZKP + RZVP.  
Using equation (4) to substitute for the first term, 
 [KP + RVP][1 + Z] + [1 – R]PB' = KB + VB + ZKP + RZVP.  
All of the terms involving Z cancel out, leaving 
 P B' = VB +  [ ]
R 1




                                                 
17 This is the same effect as if the extra Z units of capacity were not used. 
18 This is why the strike price is important. If energy from the reserve capacity can be sold at the market price, the 
margin requirement has no effect. 
19 This explains why peaking plants would add peaking capacity to meet their reserve margins as well. 
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From equation (3), PB' = PB. The reserve capacity requirement has no effect on the baseload 
price. The costs of the margin requirement are just covered by the increase in rents the  
baseload plant earns during the peak period as a result of imposing the margin requirement on 
peaking plants. 
Combining these results for peak and baseload plants shows that reserve requirements 
implemented as a fraction of capacity will increase, not decrease, expected volatility. Customers 
who cannot obtain peak capacity at the lower strike price will pay higher peak prices, covering 
the surplus captured by those able to obtain electricity on-peak at the lower strike price. Those 
customers continue to pay the same baseload price they would pay without the requirement. 
Hence, mandating reserves increases volatility. Whether that increase would be even worse 
absent the requirement, once uncertainty (particularly regarding unit outages) is introduced is a 
separate question. But this increase in volatility is a clear strike against reserve requirements 
instituted in this manner.  
Reviewing the case in which capacity is built but not used shows that retaining unused 
capacity makes matters worse, as one would expect. For this unused capacity, the strike price PS 
would be zero, but no operating costs VP would be incurred in running that additional capacity. 
Hence, from equation (10),  
 P P' – PP = KPZ/R. 
The requirement raises peak prices by the cost of the added capacity, divided by the fraction of 
time that capacity is being used.20 For baseload plants, the higher peak price they can charge the 
fraction R of the time demand is at peak will cover their reserve requirements as well, so 
baseload prices do not change. Hence, a requirement to maintain excess capacity will simply 
raise peak-load prices.  
Imposing requirements on energy production rather than capacity 
The inability of option-like capacity-based requirements to reduce peak prices on more 
than a subset of sales or to a subset of customers suggests taking a different approach. As before, 
                                                 
20 If the generators or regulators cannot commit to the excess capacity remaining unused, then the analysis reverts to 
the case above, in which energy from the nominally reserved excess capacity can also be sold at the prevailing peak 
price. In that case, as we saw, the reserve requirement is meaningless, with no effect on either peak or baseload 
prices. 
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beginning with the benchmark model, we assume that peak and off-peak demand is known with 
certainty—that is, that there is no excess capacity in either period. Hence, we can equate output 
and capacity in both periods. This allows us to treat an extra capacity or reserve margin 
requirement as a tax on energy production used to subsidize capital.  
Let QP(PP) be the amount of electricity demanded on-peak, and let QB(PB) be the 
baseload quantity demanded at any given time within the relevant period (peak or baseload). 
With certainty in equilibrium, we have NB = QB units of baseload capacity and NP = QP – QB 
units of peaking capacity. The total amount of energy supplied over a given unit of time is [1 – 
R]QB + RQP = NB + RNP. 
Let T be a tax on energy supplied and S be a subsidy of capacity. Because output (Q) 
equals capacity (N) during both peak and baseload periods, the condition that the tax revenues 
equal the capacity subsidy is  
 TNB + TRNP = SNB + SNP, 
implying that 








Letting an asterisk indicate the presence of the tax and subsidy plan, the effect of the tax 
and subsidy on peak prices, from (2), will be 
 P P* = [KP – S]/R + VP + T.  (7) 
From (6), the net change in the peak-period price is  






1 R −  < 0.  (8) 
The tax and subsidy scheme causes peak-period power prices to fall (unless R = 1, i.e., there is 
no baseload period and everything is peak), as expected, since the capacity-output ratio is greater 
for peak units than for baseload plants. 
Consider the effect of this tax and subsidy plan on baseload prices PB. From (3), reducing 
capacity costs by S and increasing variable energy costs by T, we obtain 
 P B = [VB + T] +  [] [ ] [] [ ] [ ] [ ]
R 1
T V R S K T V R S K P P B B
−
+ + − − + + −
. (9) 
The added S and T terms in the numerator of (9) cancel. From (3) and (9), accordingly, 
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 P B* – PB = T.  (10) 
The baseload price increases by the energy tax. From the first two terms on the left side of (3), 
the subsidy on capacity has no effect on price. Although it reduces the cost of baseload capacity 
(subtracting S from KB), it reduces the rents earned from on-peak sales by the same amount 
(subtracting S from KP). 
Equations (8) and (10) lay out the story. The tax and subsidy scheme raises baseload 
prices and generates a net subsidy to peak-period power sales. The size of the net subsidy 
depends on R, the fraction of time at which demand is at peak, and the quantities of peak and 
baseload capacity installed. The precise relationship between the tax and the subsidy requires 
knowing the demand functions QB(.) (= NB) and QP(.) (= NP). In this setting, the effect of the 
requirement is to reduce volatility, raising baseload prices and reducing peak prices. This 
matches, at least qualitatively, the pattern we would expect risk-averse or expenditure- 
smoothing consumers to prefer—paying a premium when times are good to reduce costs when 
times are bad.  
In the model designed here, the policymaker who knows the demand functions could, 
within the limits alluded to just above, set a target peak-period price reduction and then use the 
tax to achieve it.21 However, knowing the peak-period demand curve QP(.), the policymaker 
could just as easily set an output target equal to what would be demanded at the target price. 
Moreover, because of certainty and, thus, the absence of unused capacity in equilibrium, the 
policy could be translated yet again as a demand by the policymaker for an increase in peak 
capacity above that which one would see absent policy intervention.22 Letting ∆NP be that 
increase in capacity, the relationship between it and the price target PP* is 
  ∆NP = QP(PP*) – QP(PP). 
One might be able to characterize the policy as equivalent to imposing a “reserve margin” of 
∆NP/[NP + NB]. However, as we see below, one cannot entirely translate this policy into a tax or 
margin requirement on capacity itself. 
                                                 
21 Because NB goes to zero as T gets arbitrarily large, a policymaker has only limited ability to reduce peak-period 
power prices by this method. 
22 Again, see Jaffe and Felder, n. 4 supra, for a general discussion of uncertainty’s effect on using prices or 
quantities to implement capacity policy. 
12 Resources for the Future  Brennan 
Were one to impose a tax on capacity rather than on output, the subsidy on capital would 
equal the tax, with no effect on electricity markets. Tracing a capacity tax through the above 
analysis, one would first observe that the numerator in (4) equals the denominator, implying that 
S = T. Because the tax on is now on capacity instead of output, equation (5), specifying the new 
peak-period price, becomes 
 P P* = VP + 
R
T S KP − +
= VP + 
R
KP = PP,  
implying no change in the peak-period price, hence no change in peak capacity. A similar 
recharacterization of equation (9) above shows that the baseload price PB would also not change. 
Capacity requirements as an extreme-peak price control 
As noted at the outset, a common if dubious method for ascertaining market power and 
setting an appropriate wholesale price cap is to assume that the competitive price would be the 
average variable cost of the marginal unit dispatched. The seemingly obvious problem with such 
pricing is that it would ensure that the marginal unit would never recover its capital costs. 
Competitive markets would never set prices in this way. 
A market in which firms were regulated to provide such capacity could do so if the 
requirements led to sufficiently large capacity to lower price to the average variable cost of those 
units.23 To examine such a possibility, we retain baseload and peak plants but also include units 
to meet what we will call “extreme peak” demand. Following Dansby,24 we assume that the 
capital cost per unit of output falls and variable costs rise as one moves from baseload to peak to 
extreme. Letting subscripts B, P, and E indicate baseload, peak, and extreme units, respectively, 
with K as per unit capital cost and V as per unit variable cost, we have 
 V B < VP < VE 
and 
                                                 
23 A different approach, not modeled here, would be to require sufficient capacity such that the price of electricity 
does not go above the cost of a blackout were the electricity unavailable, also known as the “value of lost load” 
(VoLL). National Electricity Code Administrator, Reliability Panel Final Report, Review of VoLL in the National 
Electricity Market: Report and Recommendations, July 1999; see also Joskow, n. 1 supra at 37; Jaffe and Felder, n. 
4 supra. 
24 Dansby, n. 13 supra. 
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 K B > KP > KE. 
We amend our notation slightly to deal with this case. Hoping redundant notation will be 
more helpful than confusing, we suppose that for a fraction B of the time, only baseload plants 
operate.  For an additional fraction P of the time, peak plants come online as well, and for 
fraction E of the time, all three types of plants operate, where B + P + E = 1. We also will 
assume that the efficient plant for each level of demand is unique—that is, that the same 
technology would not be used to build units designed to serve two of the three levels.25 
If the regulator establishes capacity requirements to ensure that the extreme-demand price 
is VE, no firm will supply capacity just to meet that demand. Its expected revenue from each unit 
of capacity, EVE, would be less than the cost of supplying and operating that capacity, KE + EVE. 
Hence, all capacity to serve extreme demand has to come from peak and baseload suppliers. 
Under this requirement, each baseload and peak supplier has to install an extra Z units of 
extreme capacity (the least-cost extreme capacity, by assumption) as a reserve requirement for 
each unit of capacity it installs. Z is set such that enough capacity is available during extreme-
demand periods to keep price at VE.  
 A peak supplier does not operate when only baseload plants are needed. It operates its 
peak units a fraction P of the time, selling at price PP. At extreme-demand periods occurring a 
fraction E of the time, it operates its peak units and its extreme units, selling electricity at price 
VE. For each unit of peak capacity it installs, its revenues are PPP and E[1+Z]VE, where Z 
represents the amount of extreme capacity it is required to install for each unit of peak capacity.26 
Its per capacity unit operating costs are [P + E]VP for its peak units and EZVE for its extreme 
units. Its costs include capital costs KP + ZKE. In equilibrium, to ensure cost recovery for each 
unit of peak capacity installed to meet reserve requirements, 
                                                 
25 This assumption requires that six inequalities hold. Baseload plants run all the time, peak plants a fraction P + E 
of the time, and extreme plants the fraction E. The inequalities are as follows: 
  For baseload: KB + VB < KP + VP, KB + VB < KE + VE. 
  For peak units: KP + [P+E]VP < KB + [P+E]VB, KP + [P+E]VP < KE + [P+E]VE. 
  For extreme units, KE + EVE < KB + EVB, KE + EVE < KP + EVP. 
The inequalities relating baseload and extreme plants are redundant. If a peak plant is uneconomical as a baseload 
plant and an extreme plant uneconomical as a peak plant, then the extreme plant is uneconomical as a baseload 
plant. Similarly, if a baseload plant is uneconomical as a peak plant and a peak plant uneconomical as an extreme 
plant, then a baseload plant is uneconomical as an extreme plant. 
26 At extreme-demand periods, the peak unit would sell power from its peak plants at VE as well. 
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   PPP + E[1 + Z]VE = KP + ZKE + [P + E]VP + EZVE. (11) 
The EZVE terms on both sides of the equation cancel out because extreme price equals variable 
costs. Hence, 
 P P = VP +  []
P
EV ZK EV K E E P P − + +
. (12) 
The conditions ensuring that a peak plant not be economical as an extreme plant and vice versa 
ensure that PP > VP.27  
We look at the similar per unit revenue and cost calculation for baseload plants. During a 
fraction B of the time, these plants obtain revenue per unit PB. At the fraction P where demand is 
at peak, the per unit revenue is PP. During the fraction of time E of extreme demand, the baseload 
unit gets VE from its baseload unit and ZVE from the extreme-capacity unit it was required to 
install. Accordingly, the per baseload unit revenue is BPB + PPP + E[1+Z]VE. Per baseload unit 
capacity costs are KB + ZKE. Its per baseload unit operating costs are VB, running that baseload 
unit all the time, plus EZVE, when it runs its extreme-demand unit. Hence, in equilibrium, 
 BPB + PPP + E[1+Z]VE = KB + ZKE + VB + EZVE.  
We can substitute the right-hand side of (11) for the last two terms of the left-hand side in 
the above expression, cancel out the EZVE terms, and obtain 
 P B = VB +  [ ][ ]
B
V V E P K K B P P B − + − −
. (13) 
This is the same as equation (3) above, where P+E is R, the time of above-baseload demand, and 
B = 1 – R, the time of low demand. As in that case, the reserve requirement has no effect on the 
baseload price. The baseload plant recovers the added cost of the capacity requirement during 
the peak period. Hence, baseload capacity is unchanged under the requirement as well, as we 
posit that only enough such capacity is installed to meet demand at PB. 
The requirement does affect the price during peak periods, and hence the amount of peak 
and extreme capacity installed. To see this, we can calculate what the extreme and peak prices 
                                                 
27 This follows from the equations in n. 25 supra, specifically that KE + EVE < KP + EVP. We can also assume that 
VE > PP so that the capacity requirement does not lead peak prices to exceed extreme prices, but that is not necessary 
for the results.  
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would be absent the capacity requirement. Without such a requirement, extreme plants would 
have to cover their costs at price PE during the fraction E of the time when they operate. 
Accordingly, 
 P E = VE + KE/E. (14) 
To compare peak-period prices with and without the reserve requirement, let PPº be the 
peak-period price without the requirement, leaving PP as the price under the regulation. Peak 
plants thus enter up to the point at which the per capacity unit revenues from sales at PP during 
fraction P of the time and PE at fraction E of the time cover the costs of constructing that capacity 
and operating it the fraction P + E of the time. 
 PPPº + EPE = KP + [P + E]VP.  
From (14) and rearranging terms, 
 P Pº = VP + [] [ ]
P
EV K EV K E E P P + − +
. (15) 
Again, because peak plants are uneconomical to run only at extreme times, the numerator of the 
fraction on the left-hand side is positive, implying that the peak-period price is above peak-
period variable cost VP.  
Comparing (12) and (15),  
 P P – PPº = []
P
K Z 1 E +
. 
A policy to set Z large enough that extreme-period prices fall to variable cost raises the peak-
period price. It increases enough not merely to cover the added capital cost (ZKE/P), but also to 
cover the lost rents (KE/P) that would have been earned during the extreme period had the price 
been PE as calculated in (14) rather than VE.  
As noted above, baseload prices do not change, since baseload plants follow the price of 
peak plants during the fraction of time P + E that the peak plants are operating. Consequently, 
the effect of a requirement to construct enough capacity to ensure that prices remain at variable 
cost during extreme periods will be to raise prices during peak periods, imposing an effective tax 
of []
P
K Z 1 E +
. These higher peak prices imply less electricity demanded during peak periods, and 
hence less peak capacity will be built. Prices and baseload capacity remain unaffected.  
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Since the requirement reduces the prices during extreme periods, with less peak capacity 
and no additional baseload capacity, more high-cost, extreme-capacity plants will be built under 
the requirement, increasing the size of the requirement (Z) and the effective tax on peak energy 
necessary to meet the policy objective. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the desired 
price path would be to have baseload prices remain unchanged while just peak prices rise to 
ameliorate extreme-peak situations. However, if both peak and extreme demands occur within 
the same seasons or times of the day, and other seasons or times have demand at baseload levels, 
seasonal or time-of-use pricing will replicate the changes in price imposed by reserve 
requirements implemented in this fashion.   
 Summary observations 
That capacity requirements are desirable to counter the blackout externality arising from 
grid interconnectedness and vulnerability to load imbalances is conventional wisdom. Less clear 
are how capacity requirements are designed and how their costs are covered. We examined three 
scenarios: 
•  If requirements exist as a right for the grid operator to summon peak power at a price 
below the spot price, they leave baseload prices unchanged. Those unable to get peak 
power at the strike price subsidize those who can. For those customers, reserve 
requirements increase price volatility, counter to the presumed intention of the policy. 
•  If requirements are effectively an output tax to subsidize capacity, baseload prices 
increase and peak prices fall. Wealth is redistributed, as might happen if customers 
wanted to smooth payments over time or insure against high peak prices but were 
unable to do so. 
•  If requirements mandate the installation of sufficient extreme-demand capacity to 
ensure pricing at variable cost, baseload prices are unchanged. Peak prices rise to 
cover the cost of the capacity, reducing the amount of peak capacity that would have 
been installed and increasing the construction of extreme-demand capacity. Such a 
result does not seem to follow from any expected preference for insurance against 
supply risk or payment smoothing, but it could match the outcomes when electricity 
prices are seasonally or time-of-use based. 
Recognizing that the burden of paying for capacity requirements is highly sensitive to 
their design could lead to a more careful assessment of their extent and how they should be 
implemented, to mitigate uncertainty and the blackout externality at least cost. 
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